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Abstract 
The organization of cutting-edge HEP laboratories has evolved in the intersection of 
academia, state agencies, and industry. Exponentially ever-larger and more complex 
knowledge-intensive operations, the laboratories have often faced the challenges of, and 
required organizational solutions similar to, those identified by a cluster of diverse theories 
falling under the larger heading of organization theory. The cluster has either shaped or 
accounted for the organization of industry and state administration. The theories also apply to 
HEP laboratories, as they have gradually and uniquely hybridized their principles and 
solutions. Yet scholarship has virtually ignored this linkage and has almost exclusively 
focused on the laboratories’ presumably unique egalitarian organizational aspects. Guided by 
the principles developed in the organization theory cluster, we identify the basic 
organizational features of HEP laboratories in relation to their pursuit of narrow and broad 
epistemic goals. We also provide a set of criteria and methods for assessing the efficiency of 
the identified organizational features in achieving such goals.  
Keywords: Organization Theory; Management studies; Decision Theory; Scientometrics; 
Operation Theory; Division of Labor; High Energy Physics Laboratories; Weber. 
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1. Introduction 
 
HEP laboratories have been cutting-edge scientific institutions in terms of the 
experimental work performed and the scientific knowledge produced, not to mention the extent 
of the funds multiple states have invested in them, and the employment opportunities they have 
provided for physics researchers. They are unique scientific institutions in terms of the 
organizational structures they harbour, and their scientific success largely depends on these 
structures. 
As HEP laboratories have been around for approximately 75 years and receive vast sums 
of public money, it is surprising that their organization and management are not more widely 
scrutinized. Of course, this is true of the scientific field more generally; although “the division of 
labour and its management in science have become more important since the sizes of research 
teams have increased, this aspect of the management of science has not yet been addressed by 
research” (Murayama et al. 2015, 864). Furthermore, “[e]ven though the literature on the 
economics of science has grown… the study of the management of science has been quite 
limited. The management of science has not yet been well investigated in management studies” 
(Ibid.). It isn’t just the study of management that is lagging behind: “Organizational studies have 
largely ignored scientific inter-organizational collaborations as objects of inquiry” (Chompalov 
et al. 2002, 750).  
Even though it has never received a systematic theoretical treatment, the organizational 
optimization and efficiency of scientific institutions was already a practical concern during 
WWII when the symbiosis of the military and physics led to the rise of Los Alamos HEP 
laboratory in the concerted effort to design an atomic bomb. And over the years after the WWII, 
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the assessment of the performance of HEP laboratories has gradually become a requirement of 
governments, their main funders.  
But exactly what does “performance” constitute? Is it how much knowledge has been 
produced or does it also have to do with issues of efficiency? If the latter is the case, how does 
one organize a large laboratory in order to achieve its optimal performance in the production of 
relevant knowledge? Or more precisely, what organizational principles will ensure optimal 
performance of a HEP laboratory in the achievement of a particular set of goals? These questions 
cannot be answered, unless there are clear criteria of performance as it applies to knowledge 
production. Such criteria are also the basis for understanding how generating scientific 
knowledge in the setting of HEP laboratories compares to performance in more traditional 
settings.  
In other words, organizational principles are inextricably tied to the examination of 
performance criteria. And performance criteria depend on the institution’s primarily epistemic 
goals. For instance, does the laboratory need to fulfil larger public goals (e.g. educational goals 
or development of new technologies), vague scientific goals set by the funders (i.e. by 
government agencies), the goals set by the designers of the laboratory, the usually narrow 
scientific goals (e.g. testing of particular hypotheses) set by the in-house team, or the goals of 
external research groups working on the in-house experiments, who battle for funding? As we 
will see, measuring performance in the accomplishment of each of these goals requires different 
methods and metrics, and each goal is served best by a particular organizational structure. 
A helpful starting point is Organization Theory. This is not really a single theory – it is 
more like a cluster of diverse theories. In its various iterations, it has dominated both the actual 
development and the theoretical study of organization in industry and administration. It is not so 
4 
 
easily applied to HEP labs, however. A HEP laboratory typically embodies a hybrid collection of 
organizing principles, often at odds with each other and realized across laboratories. However, as 
we will argue, the common thread is that each typically exhibits organizational features 
identified by the principles of organization theory, making this theory valuable to any analysis of 
performance.  
Philosophers, anthropologists, and science policy experts (Galison and Hevly 1992; 
Cetina K. 2009; Martin and Irvine 1984a, 1984b, 1985; Perović 2016) have analyzed some 
aspects of the organization of HEP labs, yet studies of the explicit connections between the 
organization theory, on the one hand, and the organization and management of large scientific 
institutions, on the other, are lacking. As I see it, such studies are essential to understand the 
workings of modern HEP laboratories.  
The aim of the analysis, then, is to comprehensively identify the basic general features of 
the organization of HEP laboratories in relation to their epistemic goals by making use of 
organization theory and to determine the possibility of assessing their performance - i.e., 
efficiency in knowledge production in relation to those features - thus motivating further 
quantitative and qualitative studies. In Section 3, we identify the basic organizational features 
and their variations with the help of distinctions in organization theory; we consider the way they 
are related to projected epistemic goals. We also identify what several authors deem unique 
features of organization of HEP laboratories (its egalitarian aspects) as actually rather common 
aspects of large, bureaucratized and knowledge-intensive institutions. In Section 4, we provide 
general criteria for assessing the efficiency of knowledge production, referring specifically to 
identified organizational features. 
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2. Preliminaries: The relevance of Organization Theory to HEP laboratories 
 
2.1 The rise of HEP laboratories 
 
After the quantum revolution in the 1920s, physics’ new insights into the structure of 
matter required particle collisions at substantially higher energies than could be achieved in 
table-top experiments with fairly simple experimental apparatus. Hence the rise of big labs. More 
specifically, HEP laboratories were constructed to test the latest hypotheses on the structure of 
subatomic matter (particles and forces); a collection of these hypotheses is known as the 
Standard Model of particle physics and dates back to the 1970s. Since then, HEP laboratories 
have extended the Standard Model in unexpected ways.  
The final intended product of these laboratories – i.e. their immediate epistemic goal - has 
been the results of experiments typically published in relevant journals, with internal laboratory 
publications playing an increasingly significant role, because tasks and team members often 
overlap across the laboratories.
1
 In our analysis of the organization of HEP laboratories and the 
epistemic goals they pursue, we will rely on the available official records of laboratories, as well 
as historical, sociological, anthropological, and scientometric accounts of those laboratories that 
were cutting edge at their inception. Such laboratories could potentially deliver novel 
experimental knowledge about the structure of matter at the highest available energies at the time 
and were designed, constructed, and commissioned with that purpose in mind.
2
 
In particle accelerator technology, particles are accelerated in an electromagnetic field 
and then smashed against a fixed target. This technology was initiated in Ernest Lawrence’s 
                                                          
1
 Broader epistemic goals have emerged with the substantial increase in the size of the laboratories, involving the 
education of a wider public, teaching, granting degrees, etc. 
2
 A number of HEP accelerators have been constructed for industrial purposes but their aim is different. 
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laboratory. It was, in effect, the first HEP laboratory to be run as a small industrial enterprise due 
to the size and complexity of the apparatus. Already in the late 1950s, physicists realized that 
they would need an unprecedented scale of funding to probe matter at ever higher energy levels 
(Greenberg 1970, 209). Thus, the energies at which particles have been collided have grown 
exponentially (see Kragh 2002, 303 for exact data on the growth). The size and the cost of the 
apparatus, as well as the number of physicists and engineers who design and run it, have also 
risen. Particle beam energy has increased by seven orders of magnitude since Lawrence’s 
laboratory produced the first beams (Panofsky 1994, 128). While the cost of energy production 
in accelerators per energy units has decreased by five orders of magnitude, the overall cost of 
accelerators able to produce the required energies in particle collisions has increased by 10-100 
times (Ibid). To this, we need to add the cost of human resources. Early HEP laboratories 
employed a dozen, or a few dozen researchers; in contrast. Fermilab, one of the major HEP 
laboratories, presently employs 1750 regular staff, with hundreds of external collaborators 
working on projects in the laboratory.
3
 Between three and five thousand authors are cited in 
recent CERN papers reporting discoveries and measurements related to the Higgs boson.
4
  
This gives a clear idea of the extent to which HEP laboratories have grown since their 
inception. Growth was fast in the first two decades after the WWII, but it slowed when the cost 
of laboratories soared. In fact, the first fixed-target phase of the growth before the introduction of 
the particle colliders that collide accelerated beams inside a detector can be characterized as big-
science HEP, similar in scale and structure to some other large laboratories in other fields. With 
the rise of colliders at the end of the 1960s, however, the size and the cost of individual colliders 
                                                          
3
 For the number of physicists working in HEP labs in previous decades see Martin and Irvine (1984a, 192) and 
pp.193-4 of the same publication for the estimated cost of each major laboratory.  
4
 See http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S037026931200857X and 
https://journals.aps.org/prd/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevD.93.072004#authors 
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marked a new unprecedented phase of mega-laboratories,
5
 characterized by a reduction in the 
number of laboratories producing cutting-edge physics to a handful: from a dozen lepton 
colliders and six hadron colliders that could achieve substantially higher energies
6
 to only one, 
the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at CERN. Although the organizational and epistemic issues we 
will discuss were apparent even at the inception of HEP laboratories before the WWII, they have 
fully come at the forefront in this particular phase of the development. 
 
2.2 Development of organization of HEP laboratories – an overview 
  
The organizational development of HEP laboratories
7
 after WWII can be divided into 
three phases. The first phase comprises the years of WWII, with the Manhattan project for the 
construction of the atomic bomb being the major research work of the period and the Los 
Alamos laboratory the place where major research for the project was done. (Hoddeson 1993) A 
fact crucial for understanding the first phase is the sheer number of leading experimentalists, 
including future directors of HEP laboratories, such as L. Alvarez, R.R. Wilson, L. Lederman, A. 
Weinberg and others, who were closely involved in the Manhattan project. In fact “[i]t would be 
perhaps easier to list those [physicists] who did not [work in the project], for it included most of 
the Western world’s most brilliant physicists from legendary figures like Bohr to young and up-
and-coming physicists like Richard Feynman” (Kragh 2002, 268). The organization of the 
                                                          
5
 This sound distinction was drawn by Hoddeson et al. (2008) 
6
 For a list and location of major HEP laboratories producing collisions at energies in excess of one billion electron-
volts, see Panofsky (1994, 93). For an exhaustive list of laboratories prior to the Large Hadron Collider at CERN, 
see Martin and Irvine (1984a, 1984b, 1985). For a comprehensive list of all HEP-related institutions, see 
http://slac.stanford.edu/spires/institutions/major.shtml. For a complete list of HEP cutting-edge laboratories, see 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_accelerators_in_particle_physics. 
7
 In the US most prominently: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBL), Stanford Linear Accelerator Center 
(SLAC), Brookhaven National Laboratory (Stoney Brook), Fermilab. In Europe: CERN (Switzerland), Frascatti 
(Italy), and HERA (Germany). KEK in Japan and Dubna in Russia/USSR. 
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project and Los Alamos laboratory was a novel symbiosis of the military and the scientific 
community operating in a university setting (Hoddeson 1993; Greenberg 1970).
8
  
Also important in the first phase was the founding of CERN (Conseil Européen pour la 
Recherche Nucléaire). Conceived as a multinational institution, it was deliberately organized in a 
top-down fashion with a directing committee established to closely control all phases of the 
operation to balance the interests of participating nations (Hermann et al. 1987). In addition, 
various measures of organizational efficiency were introduced into US military projects during 
the war and developed with the help of simulations and modeling; this, as we will see shortly, 
laid the foundations for the Rational Modern strand of organization theory (Beer 1959).  
Thus, the first directors and managers of major HEP laboratories learned their craft in an 
environment that combined the organizational principles on which state and military 
organizations were based, and they were trained in the need to measure and improve their 
efficiency. Despite these commonalities, they went on to establish quite diverse organizational 
structures in the HEP laboratories of the 1950s.  
During the second phase, the early 1960s to the 1980s, laboratories exponentially 
increased in size and complexity, becoming, as we have noted, mega laboratories. Various 
organizational principles and management styles converged with those developed in industry and 
state administration. The very ambitious projects realized in the laboratories required close 
cooperation with industry, necessitating mutual organizational adjustment. This was true even 
for the first mega laboratories in the 1950s, but the trend grew in importance. For example, when 
discussing a CERN project recently, one commentator said, “The construction of ATLAS [one of 
                                                          
8
 In his classical theory of state bureaucracy to which we will turn later on, arguably the most influential work in the 
sociological strand of organization theory, Weber (1958) accounts for the basic elements of the administrative 
structure and organization of the military later employed in the Manhattan project, showing how it overlaps with the 
principles guiding large private enterprises. 
9 
 
two major detectors at the Large Hadron Collider at CERN] is an industrial-scale undertaking, 
and the collaboration therefore has to turn to industry for help” (Boisot et al., 2011, 4). Despite 
the specificity of the environment of mega laboratories compared to industrial enterprises, their 
directors have faced some of the same challenges and have come up with similar responses.   
At the same time, the state was channeling ever-increasing funds towards the big 
laboratories, understandably raising questions about whether the public money was being spent 
wisely. By 1964, US Congress had already expressed doubts about whether scientists were the 
best kind of personnel to manage and run big scientific projects (Marburger 2015, 47). The fact 
that the state was the major funder resulted in the assimilation of organizational principles 
dominant in state institutions, thus adding another layer to an already hybrid structure.  
Outside the labs, a fully professionalized management class was successfully running 
large industrial projects by then, while state institutions had been run by professional 
administrators for quite some time. And this new management class was educated in various 
forms of organization theory.  
During the third phase, the 1980s to the present, the rise of large colliders substantially 
increased the complexity of a few laboratories that could deliver cutting-edge results. These 
laboratories overshadowed the rest in terms of the capacity for the experiments at the highest 
collision energies available. Concomitantly, a class of professional managers with MBA and 
related degrees (e.g. project management) emerged.
9
 In addition, a formal management system 
was introduced in the US by Department Of Energy for large projects, the largest ones being 
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 See section 3.2; see also, e.g., affiliations and education of authors in Boisot et al. (2011). 
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high energy physics laboratories (Marburger 53). At this point, managers outnumber researchers 
in some departments of HEP laboratories and often micromanage their tasks.
10
 
The large industrial and state projects, on the one hand, and HEP laboratories, on the 
other, share some obvious interests but they also share certain key constraints. They are 
continuous balancing operations where decisions are made in the face of pressures exerted by 
funders, constraints of human limitation that have to be made up for (e.g. a need to constantly 
and exponentially increase computational capabilities crucial for research), limits of cooperation 
of large numbers of professionals, and physical limits (e.g. collaboration across multiple 
geographical locations) (Barnard 1938; Peltonen 2016, 74).  
They also have similar evolutionary trajectories. In the economy in which small 
businesses dominate, the fate of a business is not decided by ingenious ways of handling the 
division of labour, as it is in the setting of industrial mass production. The transition in physics 
laboratories followed the same trajectory as 20
th
 century industry when laboratories started to 
evolve from handling logistical operations performed by one or two researchers at the beginning 
of the 20
th
 century (with occasional exceptions in the history of physics) to employing dozens, 
hundreds, and recently thousands of scientists and technical staff.  
Recent forensic analyses of the failed SSC project (Riordan et al. 2015, Marburger 2015) 
reveal crucial similarities between the environment in which planning and design of large 
laboratories takes place and the environment in which large industrial projects are realized. The 
accounts of managers of the laboratories are especially useful sources to explore such 
similarities
11
, as are detailed histories of laboratories (e.g. Hoddeson et al. 2008). Finally, in 
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 This insight is based on recently conducted interviews with the physicists of various seniority at Fermilab and 
CERN. See section 3.2. 
11
 For example see the accounts of Alvarez (1968), Marburger (2015) and (Hoddeson et al 2008) for an exhaustive 
list of R. R.Wilson’s accounts. 
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longitudinal studies, anthropologists embedded in the HEP community report some typical 
aspects of the organizational challenges we find in industry (Traweek 2009). In any case, the 
development of HEP laboratories represents a symbiotic linking of corporate, state, and scientific 
organizations and their goals. Consequently, the general features of organization and 
management in HEP laboratories reflect those of their partners.  
 
2.3 Is Organization Theory applicable to understanding the organization of HEP laboratories? Or 
are they a special case? 
 
Organization Theory refers to a cluster of theories that emerged out of industrial practice 
and academic and professional management studies of organization of industry and state 
administration.
12
 The theories within the cluster can be grouped into Classical Organization 
Theory, Cultural Modern Theory, Rational Modern Theory, Structural Contingency Theory, and 
a sociological strand of Classical Modern Theory that started with Weber. We will demonstrate 
that these various strands of Organization Theory offer a powerful tool for understanding the 
way modern laboratories performing experiments in particle physics of high energies are 
organized.  
The organization and the goals of production are always intrinsically related in 
Organization Theory: certain organizational principles are implemented to provide a desired 
form of production (e.g. steady production or production boosting short-term profits). Similarly, 
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 In dividing and grouping various theories of organization, I rely on a wonderful and informative review of 
organization theory and its history by Peltonen (2016). There are many excellent historical accounts and 
classifications of organization theory each focusing on particular strands. But I focus on those relevant to the 
organization of HEP mega laboratories; in this sense, Peltonen’s classification is helpful and comprehensive. It is 
certainly possible that other work may be relevant, but this is a preliminary account meant to motivate further 
studies. 
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a key concern in the organization of a HEP laboratory is its epistemic goal (which, as we will see 
shortly, can be either narrow or broad). Put otherwise, the organization and the goals related to 
the production of knowledge in a laboratory are necessarily connected.
13
 The principles that 
shape the organization will, in turn, shape its production of knowledge, and its epistemic goals 
will shape the way it is organized. In what follows, we use Organization Theory to identify and 
understand the key organizational features of HEP laboratories as they have been developed to 
fulfil particular epistemic goals, especially considering how the goals and organization have 
affected each other. 
  Yet before we turn to identifying the elements of organization common to HEP 
laboratories, industry, and state institutions, it is instructive to look at an instance of the self-
reflection on the part of HEP management community on this issue. How does that community 
see itself in relation to the influence of the state as the funder and industry as a major partner and 
perhaps a prototype of organization and management of large projects? At a workshop held at 
CERN and sponsored by ATLAS management and its project leaders, a group of professional 
physicists-managers put together an exhaustive analysis, a self-assessment of sorts, of the 
organizational structure of HEP (CERN in particular) and its adequacy to achieve set goals 
(Boisot et al. 2011, 3). The general impression was fairly optimistic in terms of the capability of 
handling organizing tasks by pursuing autonomous management approaches (albeit from state 
and industry principles).  
The group never explicitly invoked organization theory but rather aimed at developing 
particular models to understand the organizational setting and challenges of HEP.
14
 One crucial 
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 See Torrisi (2014) for an in-depth discussion of various criteria of productivity in science. 
14
 Another telling example of an overly optimistic view of the management of mega laboratories is the unconditional 
perception of open-science, especially resource aggregation as benefiting research. The limits of aggregation have 
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specificity of the organization of large HEP laboratories, they pointed out, is shared with other 
knowledge-intensive organizations in industry and government – the business of research and 
development (R&D). In fact, the goals and structures of R&D departments in industry closely 
resemble those of HEP laboratories. Typically, these organizations evolve in somewhat 
unpredictable ways; they rely on research and innovation and, thus, continuously deal with 
organizational uncertainties (Boisot et al. 2011, Ch.5).  
This rather rare insight into the relationship between industrial organization and 
organization of HEP laboratories is only a good and limited starting point, however, because the 
design, commissioning, and performance of HEP laboratories is so broad that it encompasses all 
the stages of a modern industrial project and its organization, not just its R&D department. We 
will argue that despite the somewhat justified attitude that “the managers of knowledge-intensive 
organizations may have more to learn from how Big Science projects such as ATLAS are 
developed and run than the other way around” (Boisot et al. 2011, 25), the organizing principles 
of HEP labs are, to a large extent, deeply entrenched in the practices of industry and state, even 
though they have hybridized them. In fact, it is difficult to see how we can fully understand the 
organization of HEP laboratories without considering how organization theory has been applied 
in industry and government.   
It should be noted right away before we turn to our analysis that the dominant notion of 
the exceptionalism of HEP laboratories in particle physics as uniquely egalitarian scientific 
institutions with little or no hierarchy (Chompalov et al. 2002; Cetina K. 1999; Galison and 
Hevly 1992; Krige 1991) is often spelled out too generally and it may be misleading. There is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
been extensively studied, and the results suggest that aggregation can fairly quickly start affecting performance 
negatively for a number of reasons. (Carayol and Matt 2004; Agrell and Gustafson 1996) 
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certainly such an aspect to the organization of HEP laboratories, and this has been explored in 
depth from various angles.
15
 The reasons for its emergence are fairly clear:  
Competition for time and space at accelerator laboratories, routinized institutional 
politics, and the limited range of experimental styles heightened the competition for 
making discoveries and for testing theories. These conditions imposed extraordinary 
discipline that pushed collaborators to adopt similar organizational structures, granting 
broad rights of participation to all members of the collaboration, from graduate students 
to senior faculty. Such Athenian-style democracy has produced remarkably successful 
outcomes. (Chompalov et al. 2002, 751)  
Yet these laboratories are much more complex institutions than the last sentence of this passage 
and other similar accounts suggest
16
. And as Section 3.3 goes on to show, this egalitarian aspect 
is a regular occurrence in large institutions with a vast administrative structure – it’s just that 
HEP laboratories are a rare example of it in experimental physics and science in general. Thus, 
this organizational aspect is only a moderate loosening or flattening of a complex hierarchical 
organizational structure, the features of which we will go on to identify with the help of 
Organization Theory. This is a regularly occurring epiphenomenon of complex bureaucratized 
institutions; it inevitably eventually emerges as they get bigger and, thus, should not be deemed a 
central and unique organizational feature of HEP laboratories. Moreover, following Organization 
Theory, the hierarchical organization of all knowledge-intensive institutions, including HEP 
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 See especially Chompalov et al. (2002) where extensive interviews are conducted with researchers across physical 
science, including those working in HEP laboratories. The results show a loose administrative structure in HEP 
laboratories compared to other sub-fields, but this, as we will see shortly, does not necessarily mean the patrimonial 
organizational structure of research is as loose.  
16
 There are also substantial differences between the organizations of various laboratories, as well as differences in 
different phases of their development. They started as either temporary establishments organized around multiple 
projects or as centralized in-house run laboratories, but they all evolved into long-term standing institutions. 
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laboratories, is characterized by features that loosen or mitigate it; a tendency often deemed an 
impediment to their efficient performance. (Karreman and Alvesson 2004) 
As we will see, in many important aspects, the laboratories are far from being egalitarian 
paradises. Once we analyze their organizational structure with the help of insights in 
organization theory, it may not be too surprising that, in fact, a number of leading figures in the 
HEP community, including D. Glaser, L. Alvarez, A. Weinberg, and R.R. Wilson (Krige 1991, 
4) thought of a HEP laboratory as an industrial factory-like environment that stifles creativity. 
The organization of HEP laboratories may be somewhere between an imagined egalitarian 
paradise and factory drudgery - exactly the position of the organization of most sophisticated 
knowledge-intensive industrial projects. The authors arguing for exceptionalism tend to contrast 
the environments of the laboratories with a caricatured image of similar operations taking place 
in industry. Thus, for instance, Krige (1991, 10) praises the mutual respect of professionals in the 
HEP labs as a mark of egalitarianism, even though, as we have noted, such respect is customary 
in industry as well. Exaggerating the egalitarian aspect may conceal the actual structure, which 
can be particularly detrimental if we believe in an egalitarian norm of organizing science. In fact, 
such rather hasty conclusions show deficiencies of the analysis that overlooks the key 
organizational features we will identify with the help of Organization Theory. We contend that 
the use of Organization Theory supplements existing studies, creates a richer framework, and 
paints a more nuanced picture.  
 
3. The application of basic principles of the Organization Theory cluster to the 
organization of major HEP laboratories 
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3.1 Classical Organization Theory; industrialization of knowledge production in HEP 
laboratories 
Classical Organization Theory focuses mainly on the organization and division of labour 
in industry, but emerging analysis from the sociological perspective expands this to a wider 
range of modern Western institutions. The former analysis was developed out of practical 
necessity by industry practitioners as a normative tool for industry, and taken up by professionals 
specializing in the field of organizational tasks. The latter was a result of academic reflection on 
existing organizational and administrative structures. They converge on a number of issues, 
however. First, they both analyze institutions as organizational wholes and focus on identifying 
their various key functions. Second, they study various styles of management and their impact on 
the efficiency of institutions. Third, they track the influence of a wider social and economic 
environment on the organization. Finally, and more importantly for present purposes, they both 
provide criteria to assess institutional performance for policy purposes.  
Classical organization theory was conceived around the goal of optimizing productivity. 
A major insight in terms of raising productivity was that workers should not choose their tasks 
but perform tasks pre-planned by management; in this view, full work effort is best achieved 
through top-down management of smaller specialized tasks (Taylor 1919). This approach 
advocates a strict division of labour between workers and management, with managers requiring 
specialized skills different from those of the workers involved in the production. Thus, the rise of 
productivity crucially depends on establishing a hierarchy with a distinct skilled class of 
managers. Further development of the theory (Fayol 1949) suggests that the way to optimize the 
managerial work itself is to split it into segments and essentially treat it as production.  
17 
 
Taylor applied his ideas in Bethlehem Steel Works where he worked as a consultant 
(Taylor 1911). Henry Gantt’s (1974) subsequent development of Taylor’s work was famously 
applied by Ford in his Detroit car manufacturing plants. Fayol managed a mining company using 
the same principles (Cohen 2003). The principles of classical management proved successful in 
these initial applications
17
 and have been relied on in similar contexts across industries. 
Production increased exponentially with the widespread implementation of the new 
organizational principles, and the theory had to grow to accommodate the expanding operations:  
As the organization grows, and as the operations become diversified, the informal 
organizational model built around the entrepreneur will experience external pressure. The 
entrepreneur can no longer control all of the information. They can no longer be familiar 
with all members of staff, as the organization increases in size. Operations expand 
geographically, and direct contact with various offices is no longer possible like it used to 
be. (Peltonen 2016, 50)  
 
Thus, optimal operation requires a closely-knit and well organized hierarchical network of 
managers and administrative staff following the basic principles of organizational theory.  
Over time, the success of industrial organizations led to their expansion globally, but 
multinational corporations require a more flexible organizational and management structure; a 
matrix, as opposed to a strict hierarchy, can provide efficient communication and coordination of 
relatively loose groups and adequately position the organization in a large, diverse and often 
volatile international environment. An extended operation has to be recognizable and visible for 
marketing purposes; it needs to acquire a logo and other recognizable features in various 
domains. 
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 For critical assessments of Taylor’s accounts of his early experiments, see Wrege and Perroni (1974). 
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The introduction of a strict division of labour to increase productivity in repetitive 
activities, as specified by classical Organization Theory, has not been confined to industry. With 
the exponential increase in tasks and staff, it was introduced in HEP laboratories and grew in 
importance over time. For example, the scanning of data was initially done manually, a 
technique pioneered at the LBL, where a large number of “scanners” were, in fact, highly 
specialized technicians. (Galison 1990; Swatez 1970; Alvarez 1968) This gradually transformed 
into the need for specialists in various aspects of the computer analysis of data. The tendency 
towards specialization became a fact of life with the rise of large particle colliders in the late 
1960s; staggering amounts of data were now recorded and processed, and the vastly increased 
complexity of detectors called for dedicated specialists. Experiments performed on the colliders 
are much larger and more complex than those on fixed target machines. Even those who say the 
organization of HEP laboratories is egalitarian admit that the design of detectors bears a 
resemblance to the factory-like division of labour (Krige 1993, 10). And for a typical 
experiment, “[a]lthough most members gained some knowledge of systems for which they had 
no direct responsibility, they typically did not understand the entire detector” (Hoddeson et al 
2008, 276). In addition, the colliders are not dismantled for long periods of time, and they service 
far fewer long-lasting experiments that engage a majority of the researchers and technical staff 
available (Hoddeson et al. 2008). This necessarily led to the change of tenure requirements at 
universities, with doctoral degrees awarded for very specialized topics serving the collider needs.  
Styles of managing such large research groups varied from one laboratory to another, but 
they all had to establish hierarchical management of one sort or another. The LBL in the 1960s is 
perhaps the best example of organization managed in accord with classical organization theory; 
management was firmly in control of each stage of the design, commissioning, data production 
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and analysis, and the laboratory employed a number of highly specialized “scanners” and other 
specialized staff, who were managed top-town (Krige 1993). The design and commissioning 
phases, usually taking up a great portion of a HEP laboratory’s lifetime, were organized as a 
typical industrial project along the principles of the division of labour in classical organization 
theory. Often the director of the lab was, in effect, an acting executive. For its part, CERN was 
run by a distinct management class from the very beginning, for the reasons mentioned above. 
As part of the ongoing movement towards the division of labour and labour specialization, 
managers with specialized degrees (MBA, project management, human resources) manage 
various departments
18
. Their tasks and the tasks of managers with physics degrees gradually 
evolved towards the micromanagement of researchers who work on very specialized tasks in 
detection and data analysis.  
Even as their focus narrowed and became specialized, the research staff working on 
experiments in large colliders formed a network connecting universities around the world. Just as 
global expansion required industries to develop a more flexible organizational style, so too the 
coordination of a diverse matrix combining university affiliates with in-house staff and 
management required innovative management and communication technologies. Organization 
became a combination of formal, informal, and patrimonial approaches (discussed in the next 
section). The most famous response to this requirement was the precursor to the World Wide 
Web developed at CERN. HEP laboratories also had to establish PR units, design lab logos and 
other recognizable features as they increasingly turned into social and state mega projects. 
State funding agencies have increasingly exerted external pressure on universities and 
HEP laboratories (Marburger 2015). US laboratories initially had substantial autonomy as the 
government perceived them as a strategic asset in the Cold War (Greenberg 1970). This virtually 
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free creative period subsided with the economic crisis of the 1970s when oversight became 
stricter; feedback on performance was gradually introduced and finally formalized in the 1990s. 
(Marburger 2015) The DOE, the main financing agency of HEP in the US, understood its role as 
that of a contractor, with universities the supporting units (Ibid. 61). Thus, the increased 
collaboration among universities and their ever-closer interdependence within large HEP projects 
led to the transfer of many organizational and management functions from academia (Ibid. 61-3). 
Finally, the key goal of industry according to classical Organization Theory should be 
stability of the product in terms of quality and availability (Peltonen 2016; Taylor 1919). The 
explicitly set goals (i.e., the research products) of HEP laboratories initially varied across 
laboratories. As a rule, however, they shaped their epistemic goals in a broad, long-term fashion, 
facilitating stability of knowledge production. This initially involved projecting tests of a cluster 
of hypotheses, optimally distributed over a longer period of time. 
As their size increased, the laboratories projected their epistemic goals as even broader 
long-term strategies, leading to a general tendency to structure national laboratories in such a 
way as to provide stable outputs in the long term, rather than organizing around short-term tasks 
(Hallonsten and Heinze 2012; Westfall 2012). More specific tasks (e.g. a search for a specific 
particle) and their organization (selection of projects, scientists, and staff to pursue them) are 
now assimilated into a broader long-term strategy of pursuing larger epistemic goals.  
Even at the start, CERN took a stability-first approach to mitigate its international 
complexity; in contrast, US laboratories such as the LBL or SLAC retained a narrow goal-
oriented mission focused exclusively on testing specific hypotheses. Currently, the LHC at 
CERN is organized as an experimental complex to provide a steady stream of diverse 
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experimental results and technological innovations and as a platform for broad educational 
achievements. (Boisot et al. 2011)
19
 (See Diagram 1) 
 
3.2 Sociological stream in classical Organization Theory; administering and bureaucratizing 
knowledge production in HEP laboratories 
Quite early on, the sociological perspective on organization theory pointed to the 
astronomical increase in the size of institutions as the main incentive for bureaucratization and 
ensuing symbiosis with the state. The sheer number of organizing tasks made this inevitable. A 
bureaucratic structure was expected to enable the optimum performance of organizations (both 
state and industrial) under the pressure of contingencies, such as the increase in size (pertinent in 
HEP laboratories). Thus, in agreement with classical organization theory, “[b]ureaucratization 
offers above all the optimum possibility for carrying through the principle of specializing 
administrative functions according to purely objective considerations” (Weber 1958, 215). Such 
a structure is open to quantitative efficiency assessments of its goals, that is, assessment of 
internal efficiency (Ibid.). Technical superiority of bureaucracy over other forms of organizing is 
the main reason for its imposition. Resources, precision, and speed are optimized thanks to the 
bureaucratic organization and the professionalization of the class that organizes the institution. A 
bureaucracy can be contrasted with a collegial organization of work which is less precise, slower, 
and prone to conflicts. Thus, in general “[t]he larger the organization the more formalized its 
behaviour. … The more regulating the technical system … the more formalized the operating 
work and the more bureaucratic the structure of the operating core.” (Mintzberg 1989, 338)  
Yet Weber points out a downside of this process. The professional inevitably becomes an 
overly specialized cog in the mechanisms of large institutions, be they industrial or scientific. 
                                                          
19
 See also https://home.cern/topics/large-hadron-collider. 
22 
 
This gives rise to another set of negative effects in large bureaucratized institutions. For one 
thing, the work atmosphere changes; “normal bureaucracy” providing optimal organization turns 
into “pathological bureaucracy”. Weber was one of the first, if not the first, to recognize the 
inevitability of the tendency towards bureaucratization in scientific institutions in the business of 
knowledge production. He identified its emerging downside as the following:  
In the field of scientific research and instruction, the bureaucratization of the always 
existing research institutes of the universities is a function of the increasing demand for 
material means of management. Liebig’s laboratory at Giessen University was the first 
example of big enterprise in this field. Through the concentration of such means in the 
hands of the privileged head of the institute, the mass of researchers and docents are 
separated from their means of production in the same way as capitalist enterprise has 
separated workers from theirs. (Weber 1958, 225) 
 
As the size of the HEP laboratories increased, fund administration, human resources, 
engineering projects, facilities, public relations, and other segments of large institutions were 
delegated to professionals in those areas, or to formally educated physicists who spent their 
careers managing and specializing in similar tasks. In fact, departments for experimental and 
theoretical physics in current laboratories are only two of many specialized departments. The 
physicists’ work is often supervised by multiple supervisors affiliated with various projects; the 
tasks delegated to the physicists are structured in project-related collaboration across 
departments. It is not unusual for a physicist to have his or her work managed by multiple 
supervisors affiliated with different departments and projects.  
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As pointed out earlier, HEP laboratories feature an informal, patrimonial bureaucracy 
(Boisot et al. 2011, Ch. 11). Many or most of the participants in projects are affiliated with 
universities around the world, not with the laboratory per se. This makes establishing a formal 
hierarchical structure impossible, even one resembling a structure from the university setting. 
The hierarchy is not based on a legal but on an informal, largely unregulated, web of power.  
Moreover, there is a struggle between two types of hierarchy, a formal one coming from 
the state funders and collaborating industry and an informal one emerging from the university 
affiliated participants who derive their professional standing from the university setting. The two 
systems jostle for position in the laboratories, with negative consequences all round. Despite 
their dramatic and desperate tone, the following two passages clearly list the downsides:   
 The enormous size of Big Science projects requires constant oversight by administrative 
bodies…. The true risk is excessive bureaucratization of large scientific projects. Public 
authorities, which have the fair duty of monitoring the expenses incurred by large 
projects, can impose decisions based on purely financial considerations, neglecting their 
scientific and technical aspects. Administrators are accustomed to operate quite different 
than scientists, and can even inadvertently destroy the special vitality that thrives in a 
research environment. (Guidice 2012)  
 
The sheer size of the undertaking, the micromanagement by DOE, and the intensity and 
frequency of external oversight all led to a bureaucratic internal culture at the laboratory. 
In the name of cost control, technically needed changes and design trade-offs were 
discouraged. Decisions on technical alternatives were distorted by “political 
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acceptability” and were at times made late or not at all… Key scientific and technical 
people were generally placed low in the decision chain. (Panofsky et al., 1994)  
 
In any event, the administration of the laboratories has varied widely, from mechanistic 
bureaucracy to flexible and patrimonial. As noted previously, CERN was organized top-down to 
reconcile the multiple national interests of those participating in the project (Hermann et al. 
1987). This inevitably led to a more complex hierarchical organization. But the negative effects 
of such bureaucracy appeared fairly quickly, with experimenters complaining about the “Barons 
of CERN” (Ibid.) who imposed tasks on them. When there is coordination across institutions, a 
patrimonial, informal, model of administrating becomes necessary, as the management does not 
have formal administrative levers to impose tasks on the external collaborators who are affiliated 
with various universities and institutes. This patrimonial structure is, unsurprisingly, quite similar 
to the collaboration within multinational corporations working on a single project and embodies 
the matrix organizational structure (Boisot et al. 2011, Chompalov et al. 2002, 765). While the 
administration is informal, the organizational structure controlling research, data, and publication 
of results becomes informal but tight.  
Moreover, in knowledge-intensive institutions in general, the formal organizational 
structure tends to loosen up because of the fairly dynamic and unpredictable nature of the tasks 
and the focused expertise of most employees that cannot be supervised directly as supervisors 
lack detailed knowledge of the process (Von Nordenflycht 2010, Ditillo 2004, Karreman and 
Alvesson 2004). The loosening of the organizational and managerial structure in such contexts 
may not be avoidable and may result in decreased efficiency (Alvesson and Svenigsson 2003). In 
any case, this trend is certainly not a unique feature of HEP laboratories. 
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Finally, the flattening of economic and social differences is unavoidable in centralized 
bureaucratized institutions (Weber 1958). Mintzberg summarizes this tendency:  
The more complex the technical system, the more elaborate administrative structure, 
especially the larger and more professional the support staff, the greater the selective 
decentralization (to that staff), and the greater the use of liaison devices to co-ordinate the 
work of that staff. Essentially, if an organization is to use complex machinery, it must 
hire staff experts who can understand that machinery - who have the capability to design, 
select, and modify it. And then it must give them considerable power to make decisions 
concerning that machinery, and encourage them to use the liaison devices to ensure 
mutual adjustment among them. (Mintzberg 1989, 338) 
This is true of HEP laboratories as well. The equalization of authorships in knowledge 
production and catering to tenure are marks of this tendency. As we have pointed out earlier, 
many authors have focused on this egalitarian aspect in their studies of the organization in HEP 
laboratories in order to hail their supposed organizational uniqueness. Yet this feature of 
organization is not an exceptional occurrence in any large institution; in fact, it is a complex 
epiphenomenon of all bureaucratized institutions, not a unique and necessarily epistemically 
beneficial feature of HEP laboratories. 
A positive take on exponential growth has been articulated as the economy of scale (see 
e.g. Brinkman and Leslie 1986): centralizing production ultimately decreases the logistic costs. 
Another argument in favour of such an approach is that large institutions are a kind of 
environment that gathers human and financial resources around goals that could not be pursued 
without such institutions. In the case of HEP laboratories, the expectation has been that “this 
produces very fertile ground that is naturally open to innovation well beyond the planned 
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objectives of the project” (Giudice 2012, 110). (See Diagram 1 – the broad epistemic goals) 
Some empirical research, however, suggests the opposite is true: innovation is eventually stifled 
by over-centralizing (Agrell and Gustafson 1996) and various atmospheric effects of gathering 
large numbers of scientists into a single project or a tightly knit set of projects, and result in a 
variety of crippling effects (Torrisi 2014). An early warning of this came from A. Weinberg 
(1962, 255), who also pointed out that the internationalizing of laboratories acts as a counter 
balance to this negative effect as it stabilizes funding for political reasons. The multinational 
nature of large expensive scientific projects works in their favour: “[t]he International Space 
Station was estimated to cost more than three times that of the LHC, its cost was continually 
rising and the scientific motivations for its construction were rather weak. The international 
element and prior agreements with foreign countries certainly worked in [its] favor” (Guidice 
2012, 103). 
The tremendous, often multinational, investments in HEP laboratories quickly turned 
them into institutions that were too big to fail. Thus, “[c]olliding beams detectors are so large and 
costly that no one even thinks of dismantling them at the end of the run; the experiments are 
effectively unending” (Hoddeson et al. 2008, 281). They become social projects and a scientific 
activity in which the entire society was engaged one way or another and, thus, virtually 
impossible to dismantle.  
This inevitably defines its epistemic goals in broad terms, as pointed out earlier. Yet 
bureaucratization and its hierarchy often go hand in hand with the centralization of funding. 
Large industrial projects and military organizations alike required such centralization in the first 
half of the 20
th
 century, with the government-funded Manhattan project a case in point. The 
change in the attitude of the state as the funder of HEP laboratories was a result of a rather usual 
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developmental trajectory of the over-sized institutions, identified by Weber early on. The costs 
paid for from the funds borrowed from the public will rise tremendously in the case of big 
centralized organizations even if their productivity is constantly improving (i.e. if they are well 
organized). The industrial projects that grow fast are inevitably, at least partially entrusted to the 
state for financial reasons. This financial help can be beneficial for the execution of the project 
when vast funds are needed, but the state eventually assimilates the project’s organizational as 
well as financial scheme into the state bureaucracy as it seeks accountability as the major funder. 
Thus, in the case of HEP laboratories, initially “society was willing to buy… argument, up to a 
point, that good science is the bottom line and that the legalistic mechanisms of accountability 
being implemented elsewhere were an expensive luxury whose marginal benefit to society could 
not balance the reduction in scientific output necessary to create it” (Marburger 2015, 78). In 
other words, the physicists were allowed to organize their laboratories on their own even though 
the state was the funder. The development of the laboratories in the US during and a few decades 
after the WWII was predicated on a belief of the state agencies as the funders that explicit 
justification of the organizational scheme of the laboratories was not required as the scientists 
knew best how to do it. Yet eventually there was a change in the attitude of the state as the 
funder, a result of the funding trajectory identified by Weber. 
As Weber (1958) points out, an increase in bureaucracy and secrecy eventually go hand 
in hand. Barring exceptions of national security agencies, the goals and methods of publically 
funded institutions should be public. Yet obstacles to this eventually emerge in HEP laboratories. 
For example, traditional peer review is not possible in current HEP mega laboratories; it 
becomes an internal process as almost all the scientists working in the field are engaged in the 
project. In addition, the highly specialized science does not help the wide dissemination of 
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results; publications of discoveries are simply short summaries with little content, while all the 
relevant publications are internal. There is also a default resistance to external critique; the 
presumption that it will be suspicious is almost inevitable, since all the acknowledged experts are 
working on the mega lab’s project. This contrasts to the traditional culture of universities and can 
have negative epistemic consequences. All this is evocative of a phenomenon identifiable across 
professional institutions, one Van Nordenflycht (2010) labels the ‘opaque quality’ of services. 
  
 
3.3 Cultural modern Organization Theory; informal and decentralized organization in HEP 
 
In his work on organization theory, Merton (1940) focused on organizations as social 
systems. He advocated the view that informal characteristics of organizations are far more 
important than the transparent and deliberately introduced formal “facade” (Merton 1940). Thus, 
the analysis of an organization ought to focus on the relationship between individual and 
organization, as the status of the individual and the positive culture of the institution are more 
important to productivity than is an imposed top-down organizational structure. Normatively 
speaking, it is far more effective if managers are embedded in the community of specialized 
workers, mediating between them and the goals, rather than top-down micromanaging as a 
removed class. In what became known as cultural modern organization theory, Merton and 
others argued that the work atmosphere plays a decisive role in increasing the productivity, even 
though it is an informal aspect of organization. The human and social characteristics of the 
organization are primary movers of the organization, and informal cliques are more important 
than the transparent structure and formal division of labour. If this is indeed the case, applying 
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the rules of classical organization theory in a HEP laboratory context can be harmful, as it stifles 
or even dissolves informal community.  
A comprehensive multi-year study in Hawthorn factory tested outcomes in the 
productivity of various organizational structures, considering the social composition - formal and 
informal - of teams (Rothlisberger and Dickson 1964). Automatically recorded data on the 
movement and productivity of workers demonstrated that flat and loose management structures 
were substantially more productive. Organizational adjustment should not be confined to the 
social composition and culture of the people in the organization; it should extend to the wider 
economic environment, especially, the wider community and its social and cultural composition. 
Early case studies of a regional development in Tennessee (Selznick 1949) and a gypsum plant 
(Gouldner 1954) assessed the latter kind of adjustment and its results. The case studies, 
discussions, and analysis focusing on the “climate” or “atmosphere” in organizations (Blake and 
Mouton 1964) evolved into research addressing “organizational cultures” in the late 1970s 
(Hoffstede et al. 1990, Pettigrew 1979). Another line of research looks at the role of the broader 
environment in managing organizations (Nystrom and Starbuck 1981).   
Fermilab’s first director, R.R. Wilson, organized the first major US national laboratory in 
the early 1970s by deliberately placing individual scientists and their needs at the centre, in 
contrast to the formal, hierarchical and closely-knit organization of the in-house specialists at 
LBL and CERN, which makes his management style exemplary of cultural modern organization 
theory. He was not alone in this thinking; as we have mentioned earlier other prominent figures 
in the physics community reacted to what they perceived as the increasingly industrial 
organization of the research process in particle laboratories, and the factory-like conditions that 
undermined creativity. They objected to seeing physics going down the road of industrial 
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organization as conceived by classical organization theory. Some left the field altogether to 
pursue small scale research in biology, but Wilson stayed and built an alternative vision at 
Fermilab: “He expressed his vision of research as performed ideally by lone, independent 
scientists … Hoping to redeem what the Manhattan Project had wrought upon the world, Wilson 
… planned a utopian laboratory intended as a place of beauty… and contributing to cultural and 
social advancement” (Hoddeson et al. 2008, 6).  
Under Wilson’s directorship, the laboratory was a place for assembling experiments by 
outside groups, not a centralized in-house run institution (Hoddeson et al. 2008). Moreover, the 
in-house physicists were assigned administrative work to prevent them from gaining too much 
power in performing experiments (Traweek 2009, 137; Hoddeson et al. 2008). The dependence 
on external groups led to the management to oversee the budget and tightly schedule activities 
(Marburger 2015, 54), unlike the centralized laboratories that vastly over-spent often just 
because they could, and lowered their financial expectations to have their proposals accepted.  
Wilson’s vision within the HEP context called for the removal of the rigid hierarchy, a 
focus on individual intellectual and other needs of scientists, and the introduction of an informal 
structure of administrating the laboratory and experiments. Yet eventually the lab was beaten by 
CERN in a few break-through discoveries; this resulted in a major organizational overhaul that 
led to centralization and the establishment of long-lasting in-house experimental groups. 
(Hoddeson et al. 2008, Ch. 7) 
The factor of “work atmosphere” played a key role in organizational change as well.20 In 
the 1970s and 1980s, the main issue in the debate among physicists on “the best environment for 
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 The cultural modern approach to organization has ongoing relevance, with policy analysts in industry and science 
seeking to explain variations in the efficiency of institutions. This sort of research is rare in its explicit connection of 
organization theory and organization in science; it is on the right track and stands to shed useful analytical light on 
the HEP laboratories. 
31 
 
physicists” (Traweek 2009, 126) centred on the relations between in-house and outside groups 
(Traweek 2009; Hoddeson et al. 2008). This was not surprising, as the “[r]elations among the 
groups [were] highly, though informally, structured” (Traweek 2009, 127). The in-house groups 
were typically long-lasting and closely-knit, but they also had to work with groups from outside. 
The formal and informal relationships between the in-house and outside research groups became 
the crucial organizational point. The physicists themselves often perceived failures to compete 
with other labs, or the fact they missed discoveries that technically could have been made at their 
lab but instead were made at another one, as stemming from a type of organization that favoured 
outside groups (Ibid. 130). The in-house groups at SLAC emphasized their technical superiority 
over outside groups (Ibid. 128), and the lab director ultimately re-established the “lab’s 
traditional decision-making structure” (Ibid. 129).  
The epistemic goal of laboratories was focused on facilitating a flexible structure for 
explorative searches expected to bear cutting edge results. It was not defined in terms of an 
immediate knowledge product – i.e. results of specific tests of a chosen set of hypotheses. This 
led to a focus on flat, informal organizational structures and collaboration with the wider particle 
physics community. The job of crafting short-term tasks was delegated to a wider community of 
external research groups hosted in the laboratory, with each using its own way of organizing to 
complete its task.  
Barnard’s cooperative theory (Barnard 1938) is another instance of the cultural modern 
organization theory. It addresses “non-logical” thinking, or pragmatic thinking under pressure. In 
fact, the pragmatic, rather than the principle-based reasoning formalized in either decision theory 
or theory of rational choice we will discuss shortly, may be crucial in decision making in HEP 
laboratories (Staley and Rehg 2008). If so, formal decision theory cannot be a major guide to 
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organizing an institution, a view held by the proponents of the rational modern approach (next 
section). Nor is transparent formal organization the reason for the stability of the production 
process. We ought to focus on building the common goals, ideology, and culture of the 
organization, not on providing direct financial or career-success incentives. This may be true of 
HEP labs as well; according to Corley et al. (2006), in physical sciences “[m]ethodological or 
epistemic norms within a discipline often define the ‘rules’ that the discipline uses to deal with a 
variety of work-related issues,” while “the cultural status of the discipline is entangled in the 
shared epistemology between the members of the discipline” (p. 977).  
 
3.4 Rational modern Organization Theory; formal streamlining of knowledge production 
processes in HEP 
The operational analysis of rational systems and choices resulted from the military need 
for efficient rational management systems and decision-making in WWII (Hoddeson 1993; 
Edwards 1997; Johnson 1997). Mathematical modelling, simulations, and quantitative 
optimization were developed to address these needs in quantifiable, transparent and applicable 
ways. The methods were meant to be applied widely in industry after the war.  
The symbiosis with the systems theory of Bertalanffy and others resulted in a rational-
scientific epistemology of organization (Peltonen 2016, 91) whose goals include the 
identification of operating principles and their optimization, as well as optimal decision-making 
procedures of individuals. Beer (1959) developed a thorough theoretical account of “a cybernetic 
factory” based on a set of computational principles. H. Simon’s decision-making theory (Simon 
1947) detached operational analysis from qualitative studies by Weber and other sociologists by 
focusing on models of operations that identify and analyze relevant variables. This gradually 
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resulted in the separation of the sociological study of organization from MBA studies. The onus 
in the latter work is on optimizing hierarchical, vertical structures in order to break the 
hierarchical bureaucracy. Rationality is treated as bounded, within the operational framework of 
the organization. Thus, prioritizing and evaluation, that is, considerations of consequences, are 
always part of operations. For instance, various predictions, contingencies such as power of 
technology or size of the operation, or politics of funding are taken into account during the 
planning phase. The approach has been developed as computational Organization Theory. 
(Carley and Wallace 2001) 
This approach became a feature of the planning and organization of HEP labs early on, 
especially in CERN. Physicists built on the experience of early organizers of the Manhattan 
Project, especially the organization of Los Alamos Laboratory (Hoddeson 1993), and the 
organizers’ discovery that linking military organization and science benefited from their 
methods. Anticipation of technological advances and estimations of the capacity of the existing 
and planned technology have always driven decisions on the long-term development of HEP 
laboratories; for example, the development of the LHC instead of the lepton linear collider was 
largely predicated on such estimates. (Panoffsky 1994) And in accord with the rational modern 
approach, laboratories also introduced quite early on an operational self-assessment in the form 
of citation metrics based on the INSPIRE archive of HEP papers. Simulations and modelling 
have been part of the scientific process in HEP laboratories since the beginning. The laboratories 
were on the leading edge of the development and use of such techniques.
21
  
In any case, a clear epistemological goal shapes assessments and organizations. The 
organization is seen as a formalized network of nodes and their relations; the assessments of the 
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 Yet these techniques have only recently been used to assess the capacity of various organizational structures in 
scientific institutions (Perović et al 2015; Zollman 2007). The last section returns to this issue. 
34 
 
scientific network are implemented top-down to optimize the network’s operation, given its 
desired product, whether wider knowledge-production or narrow hypotheses testing. 
 
3.5 Structural contingency Organization Theory; the size matters in organizing HEP 
The structure of each unit and technology implemented in the production process requires 
a specific, usually hierarchical, division of labour, and situational contingencies such as the size 
of the organization or the phase of its development inevitably frame the organizational structure. 
The goal of organizational analysis, according to structural contingency theory (Thompson 1967; 
Woodward 1958), is to find an optimal form of organization by assessing operating methods 
with respect to these contingencies. This represents a shift from the study of general 
organizational systems to the study of the internal contingent organizational structure. A range of 
different types of organizations can be included, from bureaucratized hierarchical organizations 
to flexible organic organizations, as can a range of contingency factors, from size, to technology, 
environment, and business strategy (Peltonen 2016, 116). The treatment of each contingency has 
to be contextualized, measured against many other factors – and each can benefit or harm the 
organization depending on the context. 
Thus, for instance, an increase in the size of an institution will generally lead to a 
substantial increase in bureaucratization. Early empirical studies from the Aston school (Pugh et 
al. 1968), as well as more recent studies (Wang et al. 2015) demonstrate that an increase in size 
also leads to increased specialization and structural diversification. (Blau 1970; Peltonen 2016, 
120) In fact, this issue is central to understanding the organizational challenges faced by HEP 
laboratories. The downside of increasing the size of research institutions across sciences, 
including physics, has been analyzed using a number of parameters (Carillo et al. 2013; Von 
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Tunzelman et al. 2003; Katz 1982). The results show that the initial advantages of size 
eventually bring about diminishing returns, so the ways of restructuring laboratories and their 
priorities in the research process are crucial. The question is to what extent this applies to the 
HEP laboratories and how. 
The focus on building a favourable local context rather than establishing a coherent 
general system of organization may be another essential component of the organizational 
development of HEP laboratories. Japan and the US have developed different models: Japan’s 
model is that of a household where mutual agreement is key, while US labs are tightly managed 
top-down, much like sports teams (Traweek 2009, 149). As is generally acknowledged, the 
Japanese industrial management practices based on the “household” turned out to be superior to 
the US model in the car industry. Japanese factories were strategized around properly timing 
multiple autonomous and the level-field partnerships. Given the failure of the US model in the 
auto industry, some questioned its ability to manage big laboratories (Marburger 2015, 50)  
Thus, instead of a full-blown assessment and optimization of the network, akin to Beer’s 
“cybernetic factory”, optimization of the network in this case required the identification of the 
limits of its key contingencies, e.g. size/efficiency relations. Whatever the actual goal in terms of 
knowledge production (broad or narrow, long or short-term), the contingencies will affect it, so 
understanding its limits is crucial.    
 
   
4. Conclusions: organizational features of HEP laboratories and their epistemic efficiency  
 
4.1 Conclusions 
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The organization and epistemic goals of HEP laboratories shape each other. The 
principles of Organization Theory point to the following key features of this interrelation 
(Diagram 1):  
1) The organizational hierarchy, strict division of tasks, and specialization promoted by 
classical Organization Theory as the foundation of efficient industrial production 
emerged early in the development of HEP laboratories.  
2) Classical Organization Theory argues for long-term stable production as the goal of an 
organization. With the increase in size of the laboratories, the initial short-term epistemic 
goals of testing specific hypotheses (hypotheses-confirmatory goals) steadily became 
only a part of the longer-term, broader epistemic goals of continuous wide knowledge 
production (long-term, optimally timed testing of a cluster of hypotheses, education of 
wider public, granting degrees, developing new technologies, etc.).  
3) The egalitarian feature of the organization of HEP labs that some authors see as an 
exception and a unique organizational feature is simply flattening and loosening a 
complex administrative and organizational structure already identified by the sociological 
strand of classical Organization Theory in all large institutions, especially knowledge-
intensive ones. 
4) The anti-industrial reaction to the premises of classical modern Organization Theory that 
identified and promoted a focus on informal and flat organizational structures as the 
essential features of institutions was echoed in deliberate decentralization and matching 
open exploratory (as opposed to centralized confirmatory) epistemic goals in early phases 
of Fermilab and some other HEP laboratories. 
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5) The organizational dynamics engendered by the size of laboratories – i.e. 
bureaucratization and hierarchy resulting from the increased size – is the key contingency 
in HEP laboratories in the optimization knowledge production. 
6) The rational modern (operational research) Organization Theory approach that emerged 
with the Manhattan project promoted formally-based assessment and optimal operation of 
organizational structures; either overtly or covertly, this has been a steady feature of the 
development and operation of HEP laboratories.   
 
 
4.2 The organizational features of HEP laboratories and their epistemic efficiency 
The interrelated basic organizational features and epistemic goals of the laboratories are 
presented in Diagram 1. The diagram also identifies formal and informal methods of assessment 
of these features and their relationship with the epistemic goals – i.e. the assessment of the 
efficiency of knowledge production depending on various organizational features employed in 
the organizing laboratory. The goal of the assessment is to identify the adequacy of an 
organizational structure and its various aspects (as defined by different strands of Organization 
Theory), with respect to a particular kind of epistemic goal and to point out possible trade-offs. 
As we have seen, some methods of assessment have been applied (bibliometrics, embedded 
anthropological and sociological studies), but an analysis based on Organization Theory provides 
a comprehensive framework for a concerted effort of this sort.
22
   
An organization’s epistemic efficiency, i.e., its ability to meet its knowledge production 
goals can be assessed quantitatively or qualitatively, that is, along the lines of either rational 
modern or cultural modern organization theory. The narrow scientific hypotheses-driven goals 
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38 
 
can be analyzed through the lens of rational modern organization theory. Any scientific research 
has an internal measure of its efficacy. The self-assessment of productivity through the 
comprehensive HEP archive of papers and citations Inspire established and run by the HEP 
community (mentioned above) is a good model for measurements of this sort and can be applied 
across other scientific fields.  
In contrast, classical organization theory focuses on the stable continuous production of 
results, not on narrow short-term goals. CERN is managed as a continually updating and 
evolving stable long-term operation aiming to satisfy a number of broadly defined goals. 
Performance defined in this way focuses, broadly speaking, on a comprehensively satisfying use 
of large public funds. In fact, all large colliders should be assessed against such broader 
considerations. One such broad consideration is the usefulness of experimental results to other 
similar enterprises and other scientific fields. Another is that the laboratory can be expected to 
provide a constant output of innovative technologies. And it is a place where a generation of 
physicists is educated, thereby providing a platform for their success in university careers and 
their achievements of teaching goals. These broader criteria are harder to quantify, and the 
analysis must rely, at least in part, on qualitative assessments of the larger social and cultural 
context of the laboratory. 
The organization can be also assessed as a transparent administrative structure, following 
classical organization theory, focusing on the intricate division of labour, the role of the 
management class and its relationship with the research and technical staff. Following cultural 
modern theory, however, the work atmosphere and informal groups are equally essential to well-
organized operation (  ). Finally, various contingency factors, especially the size of the laboratory 
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are main considerations identified by structural contingency and sociological theory, 
respectively.  
The efficiency of each of these aspects of the organization identified with respect to the 
production of narrow and broader goals can be tested quantitatively and qualitatively. Computer 
simulations, decision theoretic analysis, assessments based on scientometric criteria, and certain 
sociological and anthropological methods can measure the effectiveness of various aspects of the 
organizational structures in terms of the efficacy of achieving both narrow and broader goals. 
These existing methods should be comprehensively applied and developed. The production of 
experimental knowledge in the laboratories can be traced surprisingly accurately by tracking the 
production of papers and citation counts (Martin and Irvine 1984b; Perović et al. 2016). The 
HEP archive of papers and citations INSPIRE was established in the early 1970s. These citation 
counts are as accurate a measure of productivity as we can get in a scientific field. On the one 
hand, oversight of relevant work is virtually impossible, since only a handful of labs collaborate. 
On the other hand, the papers are not cited to any significant extent outside the narrow field of 
particle physics, so citation counts indicate expert opinion alone. Put otherwise, they trace the 
agreement between experts on the validity and fruitfulness of results. These can be compared to 
the organizational features. The perception of the role of various organizational factors in the 
performance of the laboratory by researchers or policy-makers themselves can also be surveyed 
and concrete solutions offered.  
The US government gradually introduced accountability, along with substantial penalties 
for infractions, into large scientific projects, including large colliders (Marburger 2015, 53-54). 
In fact, this was the basis for the cancellation of the SSC funding. In Europe, this type of 
oversight was present from the very beginning, and CERN developed in a different social and 
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political context than the US HEP laboratories. The US trend towards close oversight emerged 
after the end of the Cold War. Although the funding agencies (i.e. government) began to request 
feedback on the performance of the laboratories, the HEP communities and policy makers did 
not make a concerted effort to define their goals and the corresponding metrics. Of course, a 
major obstacle to performance analysis in science is that advocacy, rather than thoughtful policy, 
usually leads funding decisions, but efficiency metrics are the basic level of any science policy: 
funders, policy makers, and often scientists themselves should require them. 
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